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Goldman's Trading Beat Is Hiding a Capital Markets Problem

GS just printed a 14.5% revenue growth quarter, the highest in three years. The composition is the issue, not the headline. Trading is doing the work that capital markets cannot.

May 10, 2026
5 min read

Goldman's revenue beat is the wrong kind of strong

Goldman Sachs printed quarterly revenue growth of 14.5% year over year. That is the strongest growth rate since the 2021 pandemic capital markets surge. The stock has responded; shares trade near $545, the 200-day moving average sits at $478, and the 52-week high of $574 is in reach.

The issue is the composition. Trading and investment management are carrying the franchise. Investment banking, the highest-quality earnings stream and the one that supports a premium multiple, is structurally underperforming the trading line. That is the argument here.

We are bearish at $545. Not because the bank is mismanaged. Because the multiple at 17x trailing earnings reflects a quality-of-earnings assumption that the FY25 mix does not support. When trading swings down in the next cycle, the franchise will be left exposed to a banking pipeline that has not rebuilt to the levels the stock price implies.

Revenue Has Recovered, But the Mix Has Shifted (USD Billions)

Trading is cyclical. The market is pricing it like it is not

Goldman's 2025 revenue mix is heavily weighted to FICC and equities trading. The Global Banking & Markets segment, which captures both investment banking and trading, is more than 70% trading at this point. The trading line is up sharply on rate volatility, FX volume, and equities derivatives flow.

None of that is durable in the way that M&A advisory or equity underwriting is durable. Trading revenue swings with volatility and balance sheet allocation. Banking advisory revenue swings with the deal pipeline, which itself is multi-year visible.

Goldman's banking pipeline, while it has improved, has not normalised to the 2021 cycle peak in the way that trading has. The IPO market remains structurally smaller than 2021 by deal count and aggregate proceeds. M&A activity has rebuilt but is concentrated in fewer mega-deals, which produces different fee economics.

The historical parallel is the 2009-2010 cycle, when Goldman's trading rebound preceded the banking rebuild by roughly two years. The trading-led recovery created an earnings profile that subsequently failed to sustain when volatility normalised. The setup looks similar.

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Net Income Has Recovered, But Operating Leverage Tells a Different Story (USD Billions)

The asset and wealth management pivot is taking longer than the multiple assumes

David Solomon's strategic pivot toward asset and wealth management was meant to reduce the cyclicality of the franchise. Three years in, the segment contributes roughly 25% of revenue. That is meaningful but it is not yet at the scale that would alter the multiple math.

Fee-based AUM has grown but at a slower pace than the franchise needs. The Marcus consumer banking pivot was wound down in 2023, which removed a stress point but also removed a growth vector. The remaining wealth and asset management revenue, while higher quality, is not yet large enough to anchor a 17-18x earnings multiple through a trading downturn.

We have followed Goldman's mix shift quarter by quarter for three years. The trajectory is real but the velocity is below what the bull case requires. At this pace, the asset and wealth management segment hits the 35% mix threshold in roughly 2028-2029, not 2026.

The valuation does not have a margin of safety

At $545, Goldman trades at 17.1x trailing earnings of $54.78. The forward P/E sits at 15.9x against consensus FY26 EPS of $34.30. The five-year average forward multiple is roughly 11.5x. The current premium to that historical average is the binding question.

Return on equity hit 13.4% in 2025, up from the 7-8% trough of 2022-2023. The 13-14% range is roughly the through-cycle average for the franchise. The normalised earnings power, in our view, is closer to $30 per share, not $34. That implies a more honest forward multiple of roughly 18.2x.

Dividend yield is 1.67%, payout ratio is 28.5%, and the buyback yield runs at roughly 3-4% annualised. Total shareholder yield is acceptable but not compelling for a financial trading at a meaningful premium to its historical multiple.

The analyst community has been slow to downgrade. The composite rating sits at the moderate buy threshold. Of the 26 analysts polled, the price target dispersion is unusually tight in the $560-580 range. The implied upside is single digit.

Operating Income Margin Has Bounced Back, But the Path Was Trading-Led (Operating Margin %)

What kills the bear thesis

Three scenarios would force a re-rate. First, the IPO market reopens broadly in the next two quarters at 2021-cycle scale. Possible but not yet visible in the early-stage pipeline data. Probability we assign: 20%.

Second, the asset and wealth management mix shift accelerates through a transformative acquisition. Goldman has been restrained on the acquisition front. The market would reward a high-quality wealth platform deal. Probability we assign: 15%.

Third, the M&A rebuild continues at the current pace and trading volumes hold. The mix concern is not a one-quarter event; it is a 6-8 quarter argument. If trading holds for that long, the bear thesis weakens significantly.

We think the most likely outcome is that trading volumes mean-revert in 2026 H2 and the mix concern becomes a 4Q26 conversation. That is the window we are watching.

The view

Goldman Sachs at $545 is overvalued. The trading-led revenue mix is masking a banking franchise that has not rebuilt to the levels the multiple implies. When trading mean-reverts, the operating leverage that supported FY25 net income reverses.

We are sellers above $560. Our fair value range is $440 to $475. The catalyst path is one or two quarterly prints where trading revenue compresses 15-20% sequentially while banking advisory fails to fill the gap. We expect that pattern within the next four quarters.

This is not a call against the franchise. Goldman is among the best-managed money centre banks on the street. It is a call against the price.

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