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Inside GE Aerospace's Cash Conversion Engine

Free cash flow doubled to $7.3 billion, the service backlog keeps building, and the FY25 print is the clearest signal yet that the post-spin business is a different company.

April 20, 2026
8 min read

The Post-Spin Business Is Finally Legible

GE Aerospace reported fiscal 2025 revenue of $45.9 billion and free cash flow of $7.3 billion. Capital expenditures were $1.3 billion, or 2.8% of revenue. These are the numbers the spin-off thesis was built on. The numbers are finally here.

The post-spin GE Aerospace is structurally different from the conglomerate that preceded it. The power and healthcare businesses are gone. The energy financing overhang is gone. What remains is a pure-play commercial and defence engines manufacturer with the largest installed base in the world, a service business that compounds with every engine delivered, and a customer list that includes every major airline and defence operator globally.

The Research Desk view: GE Aerospace is an industrial franchise with software-like unit economics once the installed base is built. The stock trades at 40.8x forward earnings, which sounds expensive until the cash flow trajectory is modelled properly. Fair value on a three-year forward basis is $380-400 per share versus the current $312 average. Buy at current levels, accumulate below $300.

What the Spin-Off Actually Did

The April 2024 spin of GE Vernova and the pre-spin separation of GE HealthCare left a single business: commercial aerospace engines (LEAP, GE9X, CF6, CFM56), defence engines (F404, F110, T700, adaptive cycle programmes), and the associated services organisation. Everything else was stripped out.

The strategic logic mattered. Commercial aerospace is an installed-base business. Every engine shipped in the current delivery cycle is future service revenue for the next 25-40 years. A GE LEAP engine shipped on a 737 MAX today will generate service and spare-parts revenue through 2050-2065 depending on utilisation. The value is in the recurring revenue stream, not the delivery.

Before the spin, this dynamic was buried inside a conglomerate where capital was allocated to whichever division had the strongest strategic case. The aerospace business subsidised other segments during their difficulties. Post-spin, every incremental dollar of free cash flow stays inside the aerospace franchise. That reallocation is the single most important thing to understand about the new GE.

The FY25 print is the first clean year showing the new structure operating without transitional noise. Revenue grew 18.5% from $38.7 billion. Operating margin expanded from 17.5% to 19.6%. Free cash flow nearly doubled from $3.7 billion to $7.3 billion. These are the dynamics the spin-off was engineered to unlock.

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Revenue Trajectory Post-Spin (USD Billions)

The Service Revenue Engine

The single most important number in aerospace engines is the services-to-installed-base ratio. GE Aerospace services roughly 44,000 commercial engines and another 26,000 military engines worldwide. That installed base generates recurring service revenue of approximately $28 billion annually (60% of total revenue).

Service revenue has two distinct profiles. Long-term service agreements (LTSAs) generate fixed per-flight-hour revenue that flows through at operating margins of 30-40%. Transactional spare parts and shop visits generate occasional revenue at even higher margins. The combined service portfolio runs at operating margin roughly double the new-equipment margin.

The compounding dynamic works because every new engine delivered adds to the installed base and therefore to the service pool. CFM International (GE's joint venture with Safran) delivered approximately 1,400 LEAP engines in FY25 and is ramping toward 2,000 annually by FY27. Each of those engines enters service at approximately $18-22 million of lifetime service revenue at current utilisation rates. The delivery volume times service revenue per engine is the true growth algorithm.

Against the nearest competitor, Rolls-Royce services approximately 9,000 wide-body engines with a similar structural approach. Pratt & Whitney services roughly 10,000 large engines. GE Aerospace's installed base is 4-5x the nearest peer. Service economics at this scale are effectively a moat; the marginal cost of adding another engine to the service network is lower than it is for any competitor.

Free Cash Flow Progression (USD Billions)

The Numbers That Support the Multiple

Start with operating margin. FY25 came in at 19.55%, up from 17.5% in FY24. The targeted steady-state margin on the current mix is 22-24%, supported by (a) service revenue growing faster than new-equipment revenue, (b) the LEAP production ramp, which is currently margin-dilutive but becomes accretive once unit cost curves mature, and (c) the defence business margin expansion from the adaptive cycle and hypersonic programme wins.

Next, return on invested capital. GE Aerospace's invested capital base post-spin is approximately $35 billion. FY25 operating income after tax was approximately $7.3 billion. That is a ROIC of roughly 21%, which is above the cost of capital by a meaningful margin and rising.

The cash return to shareholders is the third supporting data point. GE Aerospace has repurchased approximately $4 billion of stock in FY25 and initiated a modest dividend. Both are funded from operating cash flow with no balance sheet stress. The net debt position is near zero; the business is approaching a true net cash position by FY26.

None of those metrics individually justify 40x forward earnings. Taken together with the installed-base service economics and the compounding delivery engine, 35-40x is defensible for a 5-7 year view. The multiple compresses naturally as the business scales; the question is only whether the numerator (earnings) is growing fast enough to offset.

The Duopoly That Isn't a Duopoly

Commercial engines is a highly concentrated market. GE/CFM, Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls-Royce effectively share the installed base. New entrants have tried and failed; the certification hurdles, manufacturing precision requirements, and service network density make greenfield entry economically unviable.

Within that concentrated market, share is determined on the narrow-body platform by whoever wins the next big aircraft engine award. The CFM LEAP engine powers 100% of Boeing 737 MAX deliveries and ~60% of Airbus A320neo family deliveries. Pratt & Whitney's GTF powers the remainder of the A320neo. On wide-bodies, the GE9X is exclusive on the 777X. GEnx is dominant on the 787. The positioning is difficult to unseat because each platform win generates 25+ years of service revenue.

The Pratt & Whitney GTF durability issues (announced 2023, still working through inspections in 2026) have structurally benefitted GE/CFM. Airlines that expected to fly GTF-powered A320neos have experienced out-of-service time that was not in the original TCO model. The decision maths for the next narrow-body order has shifted toward LEAP.

Historically, market share shifts in commercial aerospace engines happen at generation inflections and are difficult to reverse. The current generation (LEAP-1A/1B, GTF, Trent 7000, GE9X) was locked in during the 2010s and will remain the installed base through the 2040s. GE's position in that generation is structurally stronger than any competitor, which is why the service economics are so compelling.

What Drives the Next Decade

Three specific growth levers compound over the medium term.

First, the LEAP production ramp. CFM is targeting approximately 2,000 LEAP deliveries per year by FY27, up from roughly 1,400 in FY25. That ramp adds directly to the installed base and, with a 2-3 year lag, to the service pool. Simple math: 6,000 incremental engines delivered in FY25-FY27 at $20 million lifetime service revenue each is $120 billion of future recurring revenue locked in.

Second, the defence portfolio. The F404/F110 modernisation programmes and the NGAD/F-X adaptive cycle engine competitions are active. GE won the XA102 contract in 2024. Defence revenue typically runs at similar or higher operating margins than commercial service revenue, with multi-decade production and service tails.

Third, the next-generation engine R&D pipeline. Open fan, hybrid-electric, and ammonia-capable engine architectures are all in active development. Any of these becoming the preferred architecture for the next narrow-body generation (targeted around 2035) locks in another 40-year installed base cycle. GE's R&D spend was approximately $2.3 billion in FY25, which is capitalised strategic investment, not margin drag. The recent partnership with the Indian Air Force to advance the domestic aerospace ecosystem is one specific example of the geographic expansion underpinning the next growth leg.

Operating Margin Expansion (%)

Where This Could Go Wrong

The Jim Cramer commentary ahead of the upcoming earnings print flagged that the result 'might be a tad disappointing'. That is not a thesis; it is a single-quarter caution. The structural questions are more useful.

First risk: airline capex cycle. Commercial aerospace demand is directly tied to airline profitability and new aircraft order books. A global recession that meaningfully reduces passenger traffic would slow engine deliveries. The installed-base service pool is defensive (flights still happen, engines still need maintenance), but the growth algorithm depends on the delivery ramp. A 20% reduction in delivery rates would defer approximately $1.5 billion of annual service revenue build for 3-5 years.

Second risk: LEAP durability. The engine has experienced longer-than-expected time-on-wing issues in hot and sandy operating environments. GE has addressed these with hardware and software fixes, but any further degradation in LEAP reliability would expose the business to both warranty costs and competitive share loss. The FY25 service margin did not show degradation from these issues, but the data will need two more years to confirm.

Third risk: geopolitical. Middle East tensions, US-China trade tensions, and defence export controls all touch the business. Approximately 18% of commercial engine deliveries are to Chinese operators. A tariff or sanctions scenario that restricted those deliveries would meaningfully affect near-term revenue. The defence portfolio has offsetting upside, but the net effect in a worst-case is probably revenue-negative by 5-7%.

Fair Value $380-400, Buy at Current Levels

Three paths converge on similar fair value.

The earnings-growth path. FY25 EPS of approximately $7.80 growing at 18-22% through FY28 produces FY28 EPS of $13.50-15. At a 30x multiple (a reasonable long-run number for a quality aerospace franchise), FY28 fair value is $400-450 per share. Discount back two years at a 9% cost of equity and the current fair value is roughly $380.

The FCF-multiple path. FCF of $7.3 billion growing at 15-18% annually to FY28, implying FY28 FCF of $11-12 billion. At a 30x FCF multiple (in line with premium industrial businesses), FY28 market cap is $330-360 billion. At current share count, that is $310-335 per share in FY28 dollars, or $280-300 at today's valuation.

The relative-multiple path. GE Aerospace trades at a slight premium to the pure aerospace peer set (HEICO, TransDigm) after the spin. That premium is defensible given the installed-base economics. Fair value at parity with premium peers is $400. The 200-day moving average of $296 reflects a business still being re-rated post-spin.

The Research Desk fair value is $380-400. The stock trades at $312 today. We are buyers at current levels and accumulators on any weakness below $300. The setup is unusual; a high-quality industrial franchise with compounding service economics, post-spin organisational clarity, and a valuation that has not yet fully reflected the new business structure. We expect 25-30% total returns over a two-year view.

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